Teacher Performance Incentives: A Panacea for Improving Teachers' Productivity in Nigerian Secondary Schools
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.46881/ajh.v1i1.37Keywords:
Motivation, Satisfaction, Performance, Teachlng, Learning, RewardAbstract
There is no nation that can grow beyond the quality of its education and no educational system can improve better than its teachers. This paper therefore examined the teacher performance incentives as means of improving Nigerian secondary school teachers' productivity. A sample of 1000 schools out of 11,000 secondary schools  in Nigeria (6.700 public schools and 4,300 private schools) was drawn. The sample covered the south west Nigeria using proportionate stratified  random sampling technique. Two sets of self-developed questionnaire tagged  "Teachers Performance Incentives Questionnaire(TPIQ)"and ."Teachers Job  Performance & Student Outcome Questionnaire(TJPSOQ)" with a reliability coefficient(r)of 0.79 and 0.82 respectively were used for the study. Inferential statistics  0f multiple correlation was used for the analysis and the null hypothesis developed for the  study was tested at 0.05 level  of significance. The findings revealed that there was  significant relationship between teachers' performance incentives  and increased teacher effort, teacher behaviour in the classroom, teacher  attendance, teaching  methods,  teacher retention, and student learning outcomes  respectively. It was  therefore recommended among others that  there  should he  adequate  performance incentives scheme for Nigerian teachers with/air and reliable indicators to test teachers’ performance, while sufficient  training should be organized for the evaluators in order to justifiably evaluate teachers' performance without fair or favour.
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